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Fold upon fold: figurative logics 
and critical priorities in Nicole 
Brenez’s work on Abel Ferarra
This article is a study of aspects of the criticism, and critical 
methodology, of Nicole Brenez, taking her book Abel Ferrara 
(2007) as its primary text. Abel Ferrara was translated by 
Adrian Martin, who has done a great deal to champion 
Brenez’s work in the English-speaking world. I am fully in 
agreement with Martin about Brenez’s significance, but I 
find that he sometimes appears to overstate the distinctive-
ness of her methodology. He has written that she practices ‘a 
mode of film criticism that calls itself figural analysis’ (2015); 
in what follows I shall argue that, rather than representing 
a wholly distinct ‘mode of film criticism’, Brenez’s work has 
affinities with that of critics in the tradition associated with 
Movie, specifically V.F. Perkins (affinities that I have not seen 
commented upon elsewhere). But, though both Brenez and 
Perkins give a central role to notions of synthesis, their criti-
cal priorities are somewhat different, and I shall also indicate 
some areas of divergence, which could be said to hinge 
around ideas of credibility and the importance of the view-
er’s uninterrupted immersion in the fictional world. 
Brenez has published extensively, but her single major 
work (still untranslated into English) remains De la Figure 
en général et du Corps en particulier (On the figure in gen-
eral and on the body in particular) from 1998. As the title 
indicates, the notions of figures and figuration are central to 
her approach; she frequently makes reference to things like 
‘figurative invention’ and ‘figural logic’. Martin remarks that 
‘quite deliberately it seems to me, Brenez never defines the 
concept of figure in any direct, simple, clear way’, though 
he also reproduces an email to him from Brenez where she 
insists that she’s ‘trying to be very clear: the analysis is about 
the process elaborated by the film to construct its own type 
of “figure”’ (2012: 7 & 31). I think Martin is quite correct that 
there is, in Brenez, a deliberate decision not to offer a sin-
gle, easily digestible definition of figuration; the definition 
offered by Brenez and Luc Vancheri that is cited by Martin 
(2012) is anything but simple and digestible.1 This reluctance 
does not, however, result from any wish to be mysterious or 
elusive but rather from the fact that figuration is, for Brenez, 
an absolutely fundamental concept. In illustrating how this 
is the case I would like to draw attention to the intersection 
of two familiar senses of the figurative in her work, an inter-
section that has interesting consequences for film criticism. 
This will enable me to indicate some important assump-
tions that Brenez shares with Perkins and other critics in the 
Movie tradition.
In studies of rhetoric or literature, the figurative exists in 
opposition to the literal: figurative language is language that 
is not literal (or at least not merely, or not entirely literal). 
In visual art, however, the notion of the figurative exists in 
opposition not to the literal but to the abstract. Figurative 
art represents people, animals, plants and objects, whereas 
abstract art – which does not – is referred to as ‘non-figura-
tive’. These two senses could be seen as pulling in opposite 
directions. In visual art figuration moves towards some kind 
of ‘replication’ of the world we know, while in literature it 
pulls away from it; away, that is, from direct, literal, factual 
statements about the world. These remarks need to be quali-
fied somewhat to emphasise that I am referring to tendencies, 
not mutually exclusive properties. Not all linguistic figures 
are non-literal, hence my qualification ‘not merely, or not 
entirely’; they are all, nevertheless, distinguished from an 
idea of plain, ‘non-figured’ language (even if such a thing 
could never actually exist in practice). Film is interestingly 
placed because of the way it makes use of phenomena that 
can be described using either sense of figuration. It is not 
unique in this; when illustrated, novels also negotiate the 
distinction of the figurative from both the ‘literal’ and the 
‘abstract’, and certain genres of painting employ something 
akin to literary figuration in their use of imagery (Dutch van-
itas still lives, for example). Nevertheless, although it is only 
infrequently remarked upon, the fact that fully accounting 
for many filmic sequences, images, or motifs requires that 
we attend to both senses of the word is very striking. Brenez’s 
work, I want to argue, suggests that it might be illuminating 
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to think of the role played by what we shall see her refer to as 
the “plastic” (visual) and “rhetorical” operations in a film as 
aspects of one broader process, that of figuration.2
Brenez compares Ferrara’s The Blackout (1997) with George 
Cukor’s A Star is Born (1954) which, she claims, ‘serves essen-
tially as a “rough draft” for The Blackout to the extent that 
the common motif of disappearance determines an exi-
gency of figurative invention’ (2007: 106). In A Star is Born, 
Judy Garland plays a singer named Esther Blodgett who the 
alcoholic film-star-on-the-decline Norman Maine (James 
Mason) discovers, makes a star (after she has been renamed 
Vicki Lester by the studio), and marries, before his drinking 
causes her to plan to end her career in order to care for him. 
Maine overhears this intention on her part, which prompts 
him to commit suicide in an attempt to liberate her. Towards 
the end of the film, Maine drowns himself, an event indi-
cated by a shot of Maine walking off into the sea followed by 
the sight of his dressing gown drifting helplessly among the 
rocks in the shallows. The film ends with Esther announcing 
on stage that ‘This is Mrs. Norman Maine’. Brenez writes: 
A Star is Born metaphorizes disappearance before and 
after the elided suicide. Before, by the transformation of 
Norman into a reflection: we see him already dissolved in 
the oceanic image, glazed in the glass window. It is thus 
an anticipation, a figurative prolepsis. After, we witness 
the return of the deceased on a new stage, thatof the music 
hall where Vicki, before an immense blue background 
that transposes the Pacific Ocean into an almost fluores-
cent monochrome, begins her number with the famous 
words, “This is Mrs. Norman Maine,” thus immortaliz-
ing Norman in the form of his alter ego. This time it is a 
case of figurative analepsis. (107; my emphasis)
What Brenez intends by the phrase ‘metaphorizes disappear-
ance’ is not entirely clear; it relates to her claim that both 
The Blackout and A Star is Born explore heterosexual couples 
that somehow fuse – “This is Mrs. Norman Maine” – and 
that this fusion is achieved first by ‘each partner playing the 
other’s image’ and subsequently ‘because the event of sui-
cide engenders the visual principle of figurative propagation’ 
(107). This claim is not, however, necessary for the point I 
wish to demonstrate, which is rather more simple, but also 
much more general in its application. Norman’s suicide is 
‘elided’ because it is narratively crucial but only indirectly 
represented. The scene of the death itself, as I have men-
tioned, indicates the event by showing only its preparation 
– Maine walking into the sea – and its aftermath, in which 
the sodden dressing gown also serves as a metonym for 
Maine’s drowned body. But, Brenez shows, the death is also 
indirectly represented both before and after its occurrence; 
it is foreshadowed in a ‘figurative prolepsis’ and recalled in 
a ‘figurative analepsis’. The images mentioned by Brenez are 
connected figuratively in two ways. First, they predict or recall 
particular representational images: the actual images resem-
ble each other, which is to say that their figuration – in the 
sense familiar from visual art – has something in common. 
Both images represent the sea by featuring a wide expanse of 
blue, emphasised by the breadth of the Cinemascope image. 
But the images are also connected figuratively in a second 
way, by means of their symbolism. A ‘literal’ reflection of the 
ocean in a window becomes a metaphor for the way Norman 
will soon meet his death, while the blue of Vicki’s stage back-
drop is a metonym for the ocean, and hence for that same 
event (now in the past). This, I think, is partly what Brenez 
means when she writes that ‘we have to envisage a figurative 
logic, not merely as a treatment of a motif, a theme or a sin-
gular form, but also in terms of the grouping of figures, in 
senses alternately plastic [...] and rhetorical’ (1998: 16).2 Given 
that anticipation and recall of narrative events are part of a 
film’s narration, Cukor’s film offers an instance in which such 
narrational devices require that we attend to figures both in 
the sense of visual representation (which Brenez refers to 
as a ‘plastic’ sense) and in terms of pattern and symbol, in 
a ‘rhetorical’ sense (cognate with the linguistic meaning of 
‘figurative’; attentive to aspects of signification such as met-
aphor and metonymy). It is not merely that Norman’s death 
by drowning is prettily and poetically evoked by certain 
figurative (metaphoric or metonymic) procedures, but that 
narrative functions of foreshadowing and recalling his death 
are achieved by the use of representational images (figuration 
in one sense) that signify in the way that they do by means of 
metaphor or metonymy (figuration in the other sense). 
For Brenez, then, a film’s metaphoric connotations (say) 
may be crucial to its narrative strategies: ‘This is not merely a 
matter of rhymes aiming to establish a thematic coherence but 
of constructing a film through the form of a passage between 
altered images’ (21). We should not, she argues, approach 
visual or rhetorical echoes or rhymes merely as devices that 
help generate a supplementary layer of, say, symbolic pattern-
ing, but examine the ways in which, as we progress through 
a film, we encounter images that resemble one another but 
are ‘altered’ in significant ways. Metaphorical or metonymic 
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often apply, in a broadly Deleuzian way, to the ‘logic’ of a 
particular film or group of films. The goal is to indicate the 
distinctive ways that figures (in all senses) transform in the 
film(s) in question (this is what we saw her refer to above as 
‘the process elaborated by the film to construct its own type 
of “figure”’). Having seen how Brenez’s understanding of fig-
uration leads her to share key assumptions with Perkins, I 
shall now offer an example of the kind of figurative logics 
that particularly interest Brenez, and which often lead her in 
directions that Perkins might not have found so amenable. 
Brenez devotes a number of pages in Abel Ferrara to the 
notion of ‘figurative anamorphosis’: ‘Ferrara’s films are struc-
tured like passages through the looking-glass; it is a matter 
of passing from the recto to the verso of a given situation or 
image’ (2007: 15). A clear example of what this means can be 
found in Ferrara’s Body Snatchers, Ferrara’s 1993 remake of 
Don Siegel’s Invasion of the Body Snatchers (1956), which is a 
film that, for Brenez, 
plainly obeys the anamorphic logic of Ferrara’s work. 
At the start, in an eminently familiar domestic ges-
ture, Marti [Gabrielle Anwar], riding in the back of the 
family  car, pushes away her stepbrother, Andy [Reilly 
Murphy]; at the end, she hurls him from a helicopter 
meanings, or many other kinds of implicit meaning, can be 
central to the narrative of a film, and we often understand 
them by means of the film’s ‘passage between altered images’. 
Brenez’s use of the term ‘figurative’ to cover the intersection 
of the visual and the rhetorical is reminiscent of V.F. Perkins’ 
use of the word ‘image’ in the following: ‘A fur coat provides 
Max Ophüls with an image for the rewards and limitations 
of the role of bourgeois housewife in The Reckless Moment’ 
(1981). The coat is, simultaneously, a visual image and a met-
onymic image; Perkins underlines this by choosing not to 
put all the weight on the rhetorical connotation by saying, 
for example, that the coat is a ‘symbol’ or an ‘emblem’. Not 
only this, but Perkins also shows a profound sensitivity to the 
‘passage between altered images’, if we take ‘image’ in a broad 
enough sense. He observes about Ophüls’s Caught (1948) that 
the director ‘uses three different coats to depict the options 
open to his indecisive heroine […]. The use of dress here goes 
beyond working as a simple but effective visual presentation 
of changing circumstances. It helps also to define an atti-
tude to those changes’ (1981). The passage from one coat to 
another is central to our understanding of the film on a num-
ber of interpretive levels. Another example, from the same 
article, is Perkins’s treatment of three shoulder-clasping ges-
tures at the beginning of Nicholas Ray’s In a Lonely Place 
(1950), which help to ‘establish that neither hero nor heroine 
is sure whether the man’s embrace is protective and loving or 
threatening, murderous’ (1981). This is achieved by means of 
three gestures performed by three different characters, each 
gesture being ‘significant in their own right’ in delineating 
the boundaries of the film’s Hollywood setting, but also – by 
means of the ‘passage between’ them, Brenez would say – 
serving ‘to dramatise the ambiguity of gesture itself ’ (1981).2
To repeat: Brenez recommends that we should see our 
understanding of films – of both their narrative and meta-
phorical aspects – as coming about by means of our response 
to the relationships between images which change. Tracing 
the differences between these images is crucial, and is an oper-
ation which she thinks of as elucidating a dynamic process of 
transformation rather than explaining an abstract scheme of 
patterning. Articulating the way that this happens is central 
to her critical project; her references to ‘figurative logic’ very 
down into a world consumed by blood and fire. The fold 
is perfect. (20) 
A simple act of sibling impatience is transformed at the end of 
the film into something far darker; Andy has to be destroyed 
because he is no longer Andy, having been replaced by the 
body snatchers. The image of Marti innocently pushing away 
her brother has been ‘anamorphically’ transformed into an 
image of his (replacement’s) destruction, in a process that 
illuminates both images. By referring to this as an instance 
of ‘figurative anamorphosis’ Brenez, it seems to me, intends 
the same blend of rhetorical and plastic meanings that we 
encountered earlier: this kind of pattern is figuratively (met-
aphorically) anamorphic – the rhetorical sense of figurative 
– but also operates by means of visual images – the plastic 
sense. This kind of procedure (of ‘figurative logic’, to use 
Brenez’s own language) she claims to be characteristic of 
Ferrara’s cinema; his 
[f]ilms are organized upon a single major fold, where the 
beginning finally meets or “touches” the ending to offer 
a striking comparison, or a more gradual pleat, where 
the major fold is progressively translated throughout in 
a series of small folds (akin to a pleated skirt) over the 
entire structure of a film. (15) 
Such procedures are, of course, not unique to Ferrara: we 
might see A Star is Born as another example of such a proce-
dure, in which the disappearance and death of James Mason 
is the central ‘fold’, around which the proleptic and analeptic 
images mentioned above are organised. 
Brenez is also interested in how pre-existing figures, such 
as archetypes, are deployed and transformed within a par-
ticular film; she writes that ‘Body Snatchers progresses by 
superimpositions and slippages from one maternal arche-
type to another’ (84). A distinctive feature of the film, for 
Brenez, is the dizzying range of archetypes it puts into play, 
connecting one with another and thereby complicating and 
destabilising the possibility of using any of them to gener-
ate a rigid interpretation of the film – one that, for example, 
attempted to ‘decode’ the film according to a static set of 
oppositions. Body Snatchers involves, in the first place, ‘not 
the double status of mother/stepmother but that of mother/
wife’ (84); it is not only a question of the legitimacy of the 
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posed as improper, suspect, displaced, and menacing’, in 
part because the ‘erotic vision is attributed to the scared little 
boy’ (84). Andy sees the body of his real stepmother, lying on 
her bed, crumble into dust, after which her replacement steps 
out of a closet. We see a naked female body framed from the 
neck down, emerging from darkness into warmly lit clarity, 
emphasising it as an erotic vision. We then cut to the face of a 
retreating Andy, terrified and disgusted, before cutting back 
to a close-up of the false Carol’s face, indicating the separa-
tion between the familiar mother (terrifying because she is 
so familiar to the boy, and yet he knows she cannot be his 
mother, not even his stepmother) and the eroticised female 
body. The editing emphasises both the separation between 
the two archetypes (the mother and the sexual object) and 
their connection, because we know they are aspects of a 
single body. The replacement of the real stepmother is repre-
sented in a way which both singles out these two archetypes 
and rearticulates them in an uncanny, disturbing way. Andy 
rushes downstairs to his father, screaming that ‘Mommy’s 
dead’, only for the false Carol to descend the stairs in a white 
dressing gown, now reintegrated into a form that Andy can 
see is a terrifying substitute, and that his father, Steve (Terry 
Kinney) can only see as his completely non-threatening wife, 
in her familiar role as weary mother. Brenez also analyses 
Ferrara’s use of myth, anchoring the film within popular 
iconography: 
Carol is Wicked Stepmother, witch, ghost (in her white 
nightgown, haunting the house with her oppressive pres-
ence), ghoul (vampires), succubus (demoness who comes 
in the night to be united with a man whom she will then 
eat), Medusa, enigma (her smile, whose trace appears in 
the final shot of New Rose Hotel), and, last but not least, 
she incarnates death. (84) 
Rather than simply listing any association that occurs to her, 
Brenez is attempting here to indicate the richness of the var-
ious tropes of illegitimate substitution that the film alludes 
to. (The list is anchored with concrete details: the white 
nightgown, the nocturnal setting, the smile.) Furthermore, 
she does not restrict her interpretation to a simple transla-
tion of the narrative into a psychoanalytical, metaphorical 
or mythic register; it is not merely a question of ‘timeless’ 
archetypes, but of establishing relationships between them, 
or transforming one into another. Each viewer is likely to 
register different associations somewhat differently, at dif-
ferent points of the film, but nevertheless Brenez indicates 
that the way relationships form between such associations is 
substitute mother but also the relationship between the 
female, and her body, as nurturer of children and as erotic 
being. The false, body snatched version of a woman who 
was already a replacement, a stepmother – Carol (Meg Tilly) 
– appears ‘in the marital bedroom as a nude body, a body 
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something that necessarily takes place in time, as we watch 
the film – not only when we contemplate it afterwards – 
resulting in ‘a film not of disquieting strangeness but its 
opposite, abominable familiarity’ (85).
For Brenez tracing such procedures can take precedence 
over the maintenance of the world of the film; this is where 
the difference with Perkins, who writes in Film as Film that 
‘[a]ll that matters is to preserve the illusion’ ([1972] 1993: 121), 
begins to emerge clearly.2 Brenez writes approvingly that 
‘Ferrara’s scenes are less plot events than visual echoes. Their 
logic is not especially Aristotelian, for they are not deter-
mined by linkages of cause and effect or before and after. They 
belong to a psychic process: the reproduction of a trauma in 
multiple aftershocks’ (17). She remarks that we are led, in a 
number of Ferrara’s films, ‘to the limits of understanding’ 
(129). For Brenez, these films do not merely depict the patho-
logical, but are themselves organised pathologically: ‘it is no 
longer the protagonist who becomes delirious but the film 
itself. Trauma no longer functions merely as a narrative cause 
or motor; it becomes a structuring principle’ (128). She gives 
an example of this from The Driller Killer (1979), in which a 
painter named Reno (played by Ferrara himself) becomes a 
serial killer. The film ‘offers, in visual terms, the passage from 
local to total delerium’: at one point 
[…] the link between creative torment (painting a canvas) 
and murder (drilling a tramp’s body) undergoes a lengthy 
visual elaboration. The rest of the film is devoted to 
economizing these transitions, directly joining creative 
act and criminal gesture, neither of which is connoted 
as more realist than the other. This leads to the formal 
fusion of both dimensions of experience in the final red 
monochrome. (129)2
We are often unable to distinguish between hallucination 
and reality in Ferrara’s films, which can put their narrative 
coherence at risk. One of the most dramatic instances of this 
is the conclusion of New Rose Hotel 1998, about which Brad 
Stevens – in a book Brenez describes as ‘magisterial’ (5) – 
refers to as an instance of ‘the destruction of narrative: in 
New Rose Hotel’s final section we are presented not with a 
resolution of the story […] but rather with a state of total col-
lapse in which the protagonist […] is simply abandoned at a 
moment of crisis’ (Stevens 2004: 274). But for Stevens, as for 
Brenez, such procedures do not make the films themselves 
incoherent – do not turn them into hallucinations – but are 
tools for a coherent investigation into hallucination itself. For 
Brenez, what looks at first glance like formal disarray need 
not be evidence of incoherent unintelligibility but can help 
us gain an understanding of disorder, particularly ethical 
and political disorder.
For Perkins, on the other hand, neither effective narra-
tion nor effective symbolism are likely to result if the film 
becomes incoherent or undermines its credibility, which will 
only distract the viewer and unbalance their response. A 
well-known passage in Film as Film finds a lighting effect in 
Losey’s The Criminal (1960), via which a convict’s ‘face is seen 
isolated against a black background’, to be destructive of 
‘the framework of maintained belief ’, because although the 
device is intended, Perkins assumes, ‘[a]s a means to elimi-
nate distraction’, it in fact ‘merely substitutes one distraction 
for another’ (83). Aaron Smuts, in a critical but sympathetic 
assessment of Perkins’ views on credibility, argues that 
Perkins uses the word ‘in at least three different senses and 
[…] never makes it clear how they all fit together’ (2006: 
86). After exploring credibility in Film as Film in the sense 
of, first, correspondence to reality; second, as a function of 
internal consistency (‘something like playing by the rules of 
the game’); and, finally, as convention, Smuts argues persua-
sively that belief is, for Perkins, the goal of credibility, and 
thus that ‘[w]hat Perkins’ concept of credibility amounts to 
is a rough composite between internal consistency and cor-
respondence with reality in the form of convention. Perkins 
is insistent that the filmmaker must remain out of mind’ 
(2006: 88 & 90). Achieving credibility, for Perkins, is one of 
the ways films also achieve coherence, and ‘[c]oherence is 
the prerequisite of meaning’ and ‘the means by which the 
film-maker creates significance’ ([1972] 1993: 116). Katerina 
Virvidaki has, however, recently argued that ‘if we dissociate 
a basic aspect of Perkins’ understanding of film coherence 
– namely, a film’s “synthetic” understanding – from a par-
ticularly tight form of “synthesis”, valued by Perkins,’ it then 
becomes ‘possible to argue for a pliant and variegated under-
standing of the workings of ’ coherence and incoherence 
(2017: 4 & 3). Perkins is willing to grant that incoherence can 
be significant, but sees it as likely to lead only to profligately 
unconstrained interpretation: ‘Meaning may exist with-
out internal relationship; but coherence is the prerequisite 
of contained significance’ ([1972] 1993: 117). One reaction to 
this claim, pertinent to many of Ferrara’s films, might be to 
wonder whether a film could, somehow, contain – which is 
to say motivate, make intelligible use of – its incoherence or, 
in Brenez’s terms, its disorder. I propose that Brenez’s treat-
ment of credibility, coherence, and synthesis suggests ways 
of reconsidering, or resituating, some of Perkins’ fundamen-
tal claims. This might, for example, be one way of reading 
her statement that Ferrara’s ‘work introduces disorder into 
a cynical world; misunderstandings begin here, since some 
critics attribute this disorder to the films themselves’ (3). 
She implies that the films’ disorder can be seen as motivated 
incoherence that is intelligible in relation to the disorder of 
the world at large, and would agree with Brad Stevens’s claim 
that ‘Ferrara imbricates our responses to imagery with our 
responses to external reality’ (2004: 272). 
It would be beyond the scope of this article fully to tease 
out the affinities and divergences between these proposals 
and Perkins’ assertion that his claims rest on seeing the fic-
tion film ‘as a synthetic process whose conventions allow the 
creation of forms in which thought and feeling are continu-
ally related to our common experience of the world’ ([1972] 
1993: 187). But we can say with confidence that, though Brenez 
shares some fundamental assumptions with Perkins, she has 
a different attitude with regard to the role played by credibility 
and the ways in which a truly successful narrative film must 
efficiently integrate all its elements. Like Perkins, she is con-
cerned with synthesis; one of the great strengths of Ferrara’s 
cinema, for her, is the way it ‘manifest[s] Ferrara’s genius for 
figurative synthesis’ (6). What she intends by ‘figurative syn-
thesis’ is not made entirely explicit, but there are clues. She 
admires Body Snatchers, for example, because of the way it 
maximises possible interpretive avenues. Is it, diegetically, a 
fantasy, a ‘dream of a teenaged girl […] a lethal fable invented 
so that she can do away with her brother, mother, and father’ 
(7); is it a science-fiction, ‘a futuristic essay on industrial 
pollution and global militarization’ (6); or is it, perhaps, ‘a 
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of the screen. Conventional framing is only achieved at the 
very end of the camera movement. A military truck can be 
seen facing us, out of focus and slowly approaching. ‘Carol’ 
is looking off to screen left; now she turns her face slightly 
to the right (further towards screen left) and another truck 
enters the frame from the left. The truck passes her and she 
hands a soldier at the back of the truck a black plastic bag 
which contains, we know, the remains of the real Carol.
The way the crane shot transfers our point of view from 
above the earth – only gradually bringing us into alignment 
with the false mother’s own level – mimics the extra-ter-
restrial arrival of the body snatchers and their adoption of 
human scale. Mimicry is an entirely appropriate strategy 
(figurative strategy, Brenez would say) for a film largely con-
cerned with that very process. Brenez emphasises both the 
sequence’s symbolic dimension and the way it is connected 
to the preceding sequence:
In a slow-motion sequence-shot, the false, snatched 
mother, Carol (Meg Tilly), moves toward a truck, carry-
ing a garbage bag that contains the remains of the real 
mother. Much is fused in this image of man-as-ashes: the 
Nazi ovens, the obliteration of bodies in Hiroshima, and 
the contemporary transformation of genetic patrimony 
retrospective meditation on “Hiroshima man”’ (6)? Brenez 
does not ask, like Perkins, for synthesis to be achieved by 
means of a balance predicated on maintaining the illusion of 
the fiction but, rather, for a synthesis that comes about via the 
forging of links between narrative, metaphorical, and visual 
procedures – even if this process disrupts our involvement 
with the narrative world; the emphasis is always on move-
ment and transformation, on what we saw her above refer to 
as ‘a passage between altered images’ (21). This passage may 
reorientate hierarchies at any moment; even Ferrara’s use 
of allegory she admires because it ‘is especially kinetic: his 
characters allegorize not fixed notions but questions or prob-
lems’ (13). A maximally ‘figuratively synthetic’ film seems, for 
Brenez, to be one that activates, moves among, and forges 
connections between, as many different narrative, thematic, 
and visual phenomena as possible – whereas for Perkins, 
a maximally synthetic film is one whose synthesis is itself 
maximally efficient, as smooth and integrated as possible; for 
him a synthetic theory is ‘a theory of balance, coherence and 
complexity’ ([1972] 1993: 189).
This difference in critical priorities can also, I think, be 
seen in the way Brenez manipulates interpretational prior-
ity. Demonstrating the credibility of her critical claims is 
not always her first priority; there is, in her work, a role for 
what may initially appear to be rather implausible claims, in 
the way that they encourage the reader to reconsider their 
sense of a film’s organisation or significance. An instance of 
this can be found in her discussion of a short sequence from 
Body Snatchers that Brenez refers to as ‘the fifty most terri-
fying, synthetic seconds in narrative cinema’ (10). The young 
boy Andy lies listening with worry to an argument between 
his father and sister. There is a dissolve to what Brenez calls 
the ‘dark, speckled brilliance’ (10) of an asphalted road. The 
camera moves right to bring Carol, Andy’s stepmother – or 
rather her false, alien replacement – into view, dressed in 
dark clothes, her dark hair moving slightly in a gentle breeze. 
She is seen from above, at such an angle that her face is visible 
but its expression foreshortened and unreadable. The cam-
era lowers itself, getting closer and closer but maintaining 
the same angle on her face before eventually rotating slowly 
so that she is presented at eye level in close-up, to the right 
into industrial property [...]. But the lap-dissolve that 
begins the sequence-shot, superimposing the disturbed 
face of Andy upon the cosmic asphalt, suggests that it is 
all the nightmare of a young boy. (10)
The first part of this passage permits a perfectly conven-
tional division between narrative content and its symbolic 
resonances which may, out of context, appear a little far-
fetched but which Brenez integrates into her wider reading of 
the film’s ‘figurative synthesis’, arguing for example that in it 
‘[t]he capitalist system is figured as a toxic military base’ (10) 
and linking an image of the shadows cast by a group of sol-
diers to ‘the outlines of bodies imprinted onto Hiroshima’s 
walls’ (7). But the point about the nightmare of the young son 
instead takes its starting point from a purely visual feature of 
the film: the dissolve superimposes the asphalt on the face of 
the boy. Brenez is not arguing that, diegetically, what is going 
on is merely a nightmare – ‘It was all a dream!’ – but rather 
that what she would call the film’s figurative invention raises 
this possibility, or connotes such an idea. It does so because 
it is a merely one instance of a pattern that Brenez finds in a 
great many of Ferrara’s films. The Funeral (1996) ends with 
the coffin lid being lowered above Johnny’s (Vincent Gallo) 
dead body, leading Brenez to suggest that ‘the final image 
suggests that the entire film might have been the dream of 
a corpse’ (77). She also argues that the way that a scene in 
Dangerous Game (1993) in which Harvey Keitel confesses 
his infidelities to his wife after having just learned from her 
of her father’s death is sandwiched between two shots of air 
stewardesses offering him a drink gives rise to the idea that 
he was ‘dreaming the intervening scene’ (97). Brenez’s claim 
is that it is part of Ferrara’s style, of his films’ figurative logic, 
to employ certain images in such a way as to evoke a sense 
of dream or fantasy without going so far as actually to gen-
erate a fantastic diegesis. But because films that do wish to 
indicate a diegetic dream or fantasy often use the exact same 
devices, the result is a curious and distinctive effect that hov-
ers between possibilities, with both the prosaic diegesis and 
the sensation of a dream active simultaneously; such effects 
are common even in those of Ferrara’s films not primarily 
concerned with hallucination.
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Brenez’s mode of writing is, then, related to her critical 
priorities if we understand that term with reference to the 
way she structures her arguments. It is true that she doesn’t, 
as a rule, give much attention to detailed description, but her 
work has other strengths and pleasures. She does at times 
employ a somewhat apodictic tone, which can result in what 
might appear to be grandly sweeping claims. Take, for exam-
ple, her discussion of the scene in the restaurant after crime 
kingpin Frank White (Christopher Walken) is released from 
prison in King of New York (1990), and the modes of com-
plicity with his criminality that it displays: ‘There are five 
orders of complicity: subordination, connivance, collusion, 
attraction, and embrace’ (65). Although, in context, it is rel-
atively clear that the claim about ‘five orders of complicity’ 
is specific to the restaurant scene, its placement soon after 
the opening of the section, which refers to Hobbes’s view of 
human nature and its ‘three principal “causes of quarrel”’ 
leading to ‘three modes of behaviour involving the use of 
violence’ (64) means that the possibility of reading the claim 
about complicity as a general one is, one might say, connoted. 
But it would be a mistake to read the way she structures her 
arguments as evidence that her criticism begins with the 
abstract and simply imposes extraneous ideas on the films 
she discusses. On the contrary, returning to the films after 
reading her criticism shows how closely attentive she is. 
Nevertheless, perhaps because she wants to distance herself 
from an empiricism that might consider itself to be neutral 
and purely objective, or (in another Deleuzian gesture) to dis-
suade us from thinking that philosophy needs to be ‘applied’ 
to films – rather than that films can be examined with an 
eye to determining the philosophical work that they them-
selves are doing – she tends to introduce specific details as 
evidence for more general claims, rather than as material on 
which to build those claims. This strategy might well make 
us miss the vivid description of films to be found in other 
critics, but there is surely no reason to wish for a single model 
of textually attentive criticism. Brenez, I would argue, draws 
out lines of thought which one can follow upon returning to 
the films in question, rather than merely extracting themes 
or pursuing loose associations. John Gibbs and Douglas Pye 
correctly observe that ‘[i]nterpretation has to be rooted in 
the concrete details of the text (its style) because it is only 
through these that we gain access to the film’s subjects’, but 
there are different ways such a ‘rooting’ might exhibit itself 
in written critical texts (2005: 10). Brenez’s style is not wholly 
devoted to demonstration through close reading – though 
it does do this – but it is nevertheless based, throughout, on 
close reading.
I want, finally, to ask whether Brenez always fulfils her 
commitment to fluidity and transformation by examining a 
single tiny example, which is again an instance of ‘the move-
ment of one thing towards its other’, from Ms .45 (1981). This 
film tells the story of how suffering two rapes on a single day 
transforms a mute seamstress named Thana (Zoë Tamerlis) 
into a vengeful killer, who eventually wants to destroy all 
men simply for being men. The film’s culminating massacre 
takes place at a Halloween party, at which Thana – who takes 
on the trappings both of ‘virgin’ and ‘whore’ by dressing as 
a heavily made-up nun (combining the insignia of the only 
sexual roles traditionally allowed women by men in order to 
enact her task of obliterating all men) – is eventually stabbed 
to death by her friend Laurie (Darlene Stuto). Brenez writes:
By erasing Thana, Laurie bears witness to the gesture – 
at once castrating (she wields an enormous knife) and 
protective (without this gesture, society is no longer even 
possible; it would be the reign of pure violence, Thana’s 
reign) – through which the human creature participates 
in his or her own enslavement. (90)
The gesture is presumably castrating because it puts an end 
to Thana’s use of her (phallic) gun. But what are we to make 
of the fact, unmentioned by Brenez, that the knife is also 
clearly shown as Laurie’s symbolic phallus? 
Before she stabs Thana, Laurie holds the knife erect at her 
crotch, accentuated by her black skirt which is open at the 
front, revealing her legs and underwear. The gesture is not 
exactly emphasised but the slow motion of the sequence gives 
us plenty of time to notice it. Despite the tiresomely familiar 
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misogyny which is on plentiful display elsewhere in the 
party (two men discuss buying virgins, while another man 
denies his partner the option not to be a mother by refusing 
to have a vasectomy despite earlier having promised to), at 
the moment of her death Thana is positioned between two 
instances of subversion of gender, combinations of suppos-
edly contradictory gender codes in single individuals. Her 
final victim is a man dressed as a bride in white, who stands 
in front of her; behind her is Laurie, wielding her knife as 
surrogate penis. Even given the fact that, as Brenez argues, 
there is a sense in which Thana ‘incarnates the logical, 
politically radical response to an intolerable situation’ (89), 
the consequence of fully enacting this response would, as 
Brenez says, be the obliteration of all society. Brenez notes 
that ‘Thana drifts towards a collective massacre – erasing 
all masculine bodies suspected of sexual aggression, then 
any man whatsoever, and finally […] every kind of body, 
whether male, female, or transsexual’ (42), but she neglects 
the application of imagery that transgresses gender bound-
aries to Laurie, the agent of Thana’s destruction. Perhaps we 
could read the gender slippage in this final composition as a 
whole as giving the lie to Thana’s misandry, which dominates 
her violence. Even if it is initially directed against one man, 
and eventually becomes indiscriminate, the majority of the 
film’s narrative outlines the way the object of Thana’s hatred 
expands from men who approach her sexually to all men, in 
general. According to this misandry, men are utterly other 
than women, and therefore utterly unworthy of existence. In 
fact men and women are not wholly other to one another, 
but this Thana will never understand; hence the complete 
incomprehension with which, as she dies, she says to Laurie 
the only word she speaks in the entire film: ‘sister’. 
Why, then, does Brenez not mention Laurie’s phallic knife? 
Perhaps she simply did not notice it. Perkins wrote in his 
final published piece that ‘[w]hen some salient detail escapes 
comment, the omission may as soon result from a writer’s 
decision and priorities as from a failure of observation’, but 
that it is also ‘inevitably’ the case that ‘we do fall victim to 
failures of observation’ (2017: 384). Even if Brenez’s omission 
is the result of an oversight, perhaps she was prompted not 
to notice it – if one can say such a thing – because of her 
interpretation of Laurie as an agent of accommodation with 
regressive norms. In Brenez’s reading, Laurie’s ‘irritation 
and rage in the face of harassment […] nonetheless expresses 
itself in a socially admissible way’ which serves ultimately to 
‘render the situation tolerable’ (89). Thana is, as we have seen, 
the radical alternative to such behaviour, who must ulti-
mately be destroyed, and destroyed by Laurie, the socially 
acceptable face of protest: ‘Laurie kills the adolescence that is 
represented throughout the film by Thana’s bodily mutation. 
This is an adolescence entirely aligned with rebellion […] 
Once dead, Thana can become an adult, that is, servile’ (90). 
It would not have been easy for Brenez’s argument to explore 
the consequences of any transgressive sexuality associated 
with Laurie while retaining such a firm opposition between 
two forms of protest as embodied in the two characters. This 
small example can serve as a reminder of how vigilant the 
critic concerned with figurative transformation needs to be, 
because of how seductive static oppositions can be even to 
those explicitly dedicated to avoiding them.
There does not, then, seem to me to be such a thing as ‘fig-
ural criticism’, if it is considered to be an alternative to other, 
supposedly more traditional, methods. (Not to mention the 
fact that the Movie tradition is by no means monolithic or 
even entirely coherent; the writings of, say, Andrew Britton or 
Raymond Durgnat are in some ways almost as different from 
Perkins as is Brenez.) Brenez’s approach offers an example of 
alternative emphasis rather than a wholly distinct approach 
to criticism. This is not, of course, a weakness because it 
increases the ways in which Brenez’s practice could usefully 
inform other styles of criticism; to take on board its example 
does not require that one subscribe fully to her method in all 
its aspects. Brenez may sometimes invert critical priorities, 
but she does not do so merely to be different. Her thinking 
is systematic (in that it makes structurally interconnected 
theoretical propositions and articulates a strong sense of 
films as interrelated wholes, as well as parts of oeuvres that 
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themselves, in turn, form interrelated wholes) but not in such 
a way that any omission discovered risks its collapse. I see no 
reason why one cannot envisage a criticism that combines 
the nuanced description and sensitivity to pattern and moti-
vation we find in critics such as Perkins with the interests in 
explicit theoretical construction and varied forms of excess 
and disorder that motivate Brenez. Such a criticism might 
provide some fresh perspectives as well as facilitating the 
application of some of Perkins’ most important insights to 
films that those critics who draw on his methodology have 
sometimes tended to consider as lying out of bounds. 
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1 The definition states that figuration is the ‘symbolic game or process 
aiming to establish a fixed, evolving or unstable correlation between 
the plastic, aural and narrative parameters able to elicit fundamental 
categories of representation (such as the visible and invisible, mimesis, 
reflection, appearance and disappearance, image and origin, the 
integral and the discontinuous, form, the intelligible, the part and the 
whole [...]) and other parameters – which may be the same parameters, 
depending on the particular type of determination effected – relating 
to fundamental categories of ontology (such as being and appearance, 
essence and apparition, being and nothingness, same and other, the 
immediate, the reflective, inner and outer, […]).’ (translated by Adrian 
Martin and cited in Martin 2012: 8). 
2 I shall concentrate in this article on the notion of figuration, rather 
than attempting to define what a figure might be. This is because, as 
I attempt to make clear in the course of the article, figuration is, for 
Brenez, so fundamentally processual that defining the noun associated 
with, or resulting from, such processes would involve us in complexities 
that are not to the point here.
3 My translation. ‘Il faut envisager ensuite la logique figurative, non 
pas seulement comme traitement d’un motif, d’un thème ou d’une 
forme singulière, mais aussi en termes de groupement de figures, au 
sens tour à tour plastique (le contour corporel, l’effigie) et rhétorique 
(enchaînements et déchaînements, syntaxe et parataxe des liens 
eux-mêmes).’
4 Thanks to Alex Clayton for prompting me to think harder about 
this resonance between Perkins and Brenez and suggesting these 
examples.
5 This phrase should not be seen as implying than Perkins was any kind 
of naïve realist; it indicates, instead, his resistance (at the time he wrote 
Film as Film) to certain aspects of modernism. This resistance finds 
expression in the stipulation – which this phrase reflects – that once 
the rules of the film world are set up, whatever they may be, then it is 
important for the film to abide by them, lest the viewer’s experience be 
unhelpfully disrupted.
6 The film draws connections between the acts of painting and 
(murdering by) drilling, and both activities reach a culmination in the 
final monochrome, which is both a ‘painterly’ image and a metonym for 
blood – once again the two senses of figuration (plastic and rhetorical) 
are entwined.
